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ABSTRACT 
 
Long Term Earnings Inequality, Earnings Instability and 
Temporary Employment in Spain: 1993–2000*
 
This paper provides a longitudinal perspective on changes in Spanish male earnings 
inequality for the period 1993-2000, by decomposing the earnings covariance structure into 
its permanent and transitory parts. According to the Spanish sample of the European 
Community Household Panel, cross-sectional earnings inequality of male full-time employees 
falls over the second half of the Nineties. The longitudinal analysis shows that such decline 
was determined by a decrease in earnings instability and an increase of the permanent 
earnings component. Given the marked decline in temporary employment over the sample 
period, we also examine the effect of the type of contract on earnings variance components, 
and we find that workers with fixed-term contract have on average more instability than 
workers with permanent contract. This evidence suggests that the decline in temporary 
employment is responsible for the decreasing earnings instability. 
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1 Introduction
Following the early contribution of Lillard and Willis (1978), several studies have more
recently analyzed the structure of earnings inequality over time to find out whether
observed annual earnings differentials are driven by earnings differences that persist
over time or rather reflect earnings instability.1 Empirical studies for North America
and several European countries, typically find that both earnings components are
important to explain recent trends in earnings inequality.
The distinction between permanent and transitory earnings component is impor-
tant for several reasons. It provides information to help evaluate the various arguments
which have been proposed in order to explain increases in earnings inequality in an-
glosaxon countries. For instance, skill-biased technological change or demand shifts
that benefit the highly paid would be consistent with increased earnings inequality
being accounted for mostly by persistent differentials. On the contrary, large earnings
instability would provide support to explanations favouring the decline of worker-firm
attachment, possibly due to increased outsourcing or decreased employment protection
legislation (Haider (2001)).
From a policy perspective, the degree of persistence in individual earnings differ-
ences also tells us to what extent low earnings is a lasting or a one-off experience.
The effectiveness of policies aimed at low-income households can differ substantially
depending on whether they face temporary or long-term poverty situations. Whereas
earnings volatility may be targeted by correcting market imperfections, long-term in-
equality suggests the need for intervention aimed at increasing the long-term earnings
potential of the low paid, such as active labour market policies (e.g. training pro-
grams).
This paper examines the longitudinal features of Spanish earnings inequality and
provides information on the relative importance of long-term earnings inequality and
earnings instability in a period with stable earnings inequality but important insti-
tutional changes in the labour market. In particular, key Employment Protection
1Some recent contributions are Dickens (2000), Kalwij and Alessie (2003) and Ramos (2003) for
Britain; Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995, 2002) Baker (1997) and Haider (2001) for the United States;
Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada; Biewen (2005) for Germany and Cappellari (2004) for Italy. Prior
to these studies, and with the exception of Abowd and Card (1989), the literature on the covariance
structure of earnings jumps back to the late 1970s and early 1980s: Lillard and Willis (1978); Lillard
and Weiss (1979); McCurdy (1982).
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Legislation (EPL) provisions were substantially changed with the aim of reducing the
very large incidence of temporary employment. As a result, the share of temporary
employment fell from an all time high 35% in 1995 to 32% by the end of our sample
period (see Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002)). Over the last three decades, many
European countries relied on changing EPL to combat the rise in unemployment. Be-
cause of that, many of the labour market consequences of changing EPL have attracted
the attention of the profession –see the two featured numbers of the Economic Jour-
nal of June 2002 and 2007 for recent contributions. However, the often presumed
positive association between lower EPL and earnings instability remains largely un-
explored (but see Cappellari and Leonardi (2006)). We also examine the relationship
between temporary employment and earnings instability and investigate the extent to
which changes in temporary employment are responsible for the estimated changes in
earnings instability.
We decompose individual earnings into its permanent and transitory components
by fitting error component models to the covariance structure of individual earnings.2
For this purpose we use the eight waves of the Spanish component of the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP). Our findings suggest that earnings instability
may have decreased over the period; thus increasing earnings persistence. The latter
increases over the life-cycle, which implies lower instability for older cohorts, and
accords with most international evidence. We also find larger earnings instability and
lower long-term inequality for temporary contract workers, which suggests that the
reduction in temporary employment may have contributed to the estimated fall in
earnings instability over the second half of the Nineties.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data
and our methodological decisions. Section 3 presents relevant evidence on earnings
statics and dynamics. Section 4 contains a discussion of the error components models.
Section 5 presents our main empirical results. Section 6 examines the relationship
between type of contract and earnings instability. Finally, section 7 summarizes the
main findings and suggests avenues for further research.
2Cutanda (2002) tries to identify the permanent and transitory components of income inequality
in Spain from cross-section data by exploiting the distinct effect that transitory shocks should have
on consumption and income dispersion under the life-cycle hypothesis (Blundell and Preston (1998)).
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2 Data and methodological decisions
The dynamic nature of the analysis requires longitudinal data. We employ the eight
waves of the Spanish component of the ECHP, covering the period 1993-2000.3
As most previous studies, we analyze only males. This allows mitigating issues
of endogenous female labour market participation, which may be exacerbated when
analyzing earnings dynamics. In particular, the sample is restricted to full-time male
employees who reported positive earnings in at least one of the eight waves. Therefore,
individuals are allowed to enter the panel at any wave and to re-enter the panel if they
do exit. Such a sample selection produces an unbalanced panel since not all persons
are present for all eight waves. Movements into and out of the sample may be due
to unemployment, retirement, mobility to or from self-employment and attrition. The
use of the unbalanced panel helps mitigate the potential overestimation of earnings
persistence that would arise from balanced samples in which only individuals with
positive earnings in each wave contribute to estimation.
To separate life-cycle from time effects, we partition the sample into four age co-
horts.4 The youngest cohort contains males born after 1964, i.e. aged less than 31 in
1994. The middle cohorts contain those born between 1954 and 1963, and between
1944 and 1953. The oldest cohort comprises those individuals born before 1943, so
aged 50 years or more in 1994 when wave 1 takes place.
Furthermore, we select male workers aged between 21 and 60, so the chosen age
range selects out the extremes of the earnings life cycle, where volatility arising just
after labour market entry or before retirement may be confounded with volatility due
to structural labour market changes. The final sample consists of 5,268 individuals
and a total of 20,605 individual-year observations.
The earnings measure is the log of the gross annual earnings or salary, deflated
3The ECHP is a specially conducted survey and belongs to the ever more complete set of harmo-
nized statistical operations for European Union (EU) countries. ECHP uses fixed panel techniques
for 8 annual cycles. The population scope is the private households who live in main family dwellings
and the set of people who are members of the household. In the case of Spain, the geographic scope
is national with the exception of Ceuta and Melilla. The collection method is personal and phone
interviews. Although the ECHP questionnaires cover the period 1994-2001, our sample period is
1993-2000 because the earnings questions refer to the year prior to the interview.
4Ideally, we would like to consider one age cohort per year of birth. However, because of the small
simple size, we group individuals born in different years into the same cohort. In other words, we
chose this level of disaggregation to ensure that there are sufficient observations in each cohort to
make the analysis meaningful.
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Figure 1: Earnings inequality in Spain 1993-2000
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
GINI Atkinson 1
MLD (Theil 0) Variance of logs
Note: Variance of logs depicted against secondary axis. Source: ECHP, own calculations.
by the consumer price index. Our strategy is to work with log-earnings as individual
specific deviation from the mean. 5
3 Description of earnings differences
According to standard inequality measures (see Figure 1), cross-section earnings in-
equality displays a flat trend over the sample period, increasing in the first half of the
period and decreasing thereafter. Such a cross-section picture, however, does not tell
us anything about the dynamics of individual earnings or about the relative impor-
tance of the permanent and transitory components of earnings. In order to analyze
the dynamics of individual earnings and to assess the extent to which earnings dif-
ferences may persist over time, we estimate the covariance matrix of the log-earnings
for each cohort. Covariance matrices contain 144 unique elements (8 variances and 28
covariances for each one of the four cohorts).6
For all cohorts the covariances are positive and quite large in magnitude relative
to the variances. They fall quite sharply for the first couple of lags and then appear
to asymptote to a long run level at longer lags. This is consistent with the presence
of a permanent individual component of earnings and a transitory component that
5The same strategy is followed by Baker and Solon (2003) and Cappellari (2004)
6For a detailed technical description of how to estimate covariance matrices with an unbalanced
panel see the Technical Appendix in Dickens (2000). Covariance matrices for each cohort are available
from the authors.
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is serially correlated. In addition, the relative magnitudes of the covariances differ
across cohorts; the ratio of the longer lag covariances to the variances is smaller for
the younger cohorts than for the older cohorts.
4 Error component models
The purpose of this section is to present some parsimonious error component models
that will characterize the dynamic structure of individual earnings. Let us begin
with the simplest model of all, which, despite its simplicity, provides a very intuitive
insight into the matter of concern. However, since this first model overlooks several
important features of the earnings dynamics, we later on discuss and employ a more
general model.
Let Yict denote the log earnings in year t of the ith sample member belonging to
cohort c. Then,
Yict = µct + yict (1)
expresses Yict as the cohort-specific mean µct in the year t plus an individual specific
deviation from that mean, yict.
7 The most rudimentary error component model is the
canonical permanent-transitory model with a white-noise transitory component,
yict = αic + vict (2)
where yict is expressed as the sum of a time-invariant earnings component αic with
population variance σ2α, and a time-varying transitory component vict with variance
σ2v . The transitory component is assumed to be serially uncorrelated, and αic and vict
are orthogonal to each other. The covariance of earnings is determined by:
Cov(yit, yis) =
 σ2α + σ2v t = sσ2α t 6= s (3)
The variance of current relative earnings yict is σ
2
α + σ
2
v , which exceeds σ
2
α, the
variance in the permanent component of earnings, by σ2v , the variance of transitory
earnings. The variance of the permanent component, σ2α, (which fully determines
7Some previous studies have tried to partial out µct with first-stage regressions that take account
of year and age effects. We do not pursue this strategy here.
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the covariances) represents the persistent dispersion of earnings, and the individual
component αic is seen as representing the effects of (unmeasured) characteristics such
as ability and work-related tastes which are assumed to persist throughout the sample
period.
However, this rudimentary model possesses several weaknesses that renders it in-
appropriate for our purposes. First, several empirical studies have found evidence of
persistent heterogeneity across individuals, not only in their levels of earnings, but in
their growth rates.8 Second, some earnings shocks have permanent effects, and some of
the more recent literature on earnings dynamics has modelled such earnings variation
with a random-walk component.9 Third, most studies have found that the transitory
component is serially correlated.10
The following specification extends the simple model in (2) and encompasses all
the relevant aspects of earnings dynamics considered above:
yict = ptgc[αic + ηiaict + uict] + λtscvict (4)
where
uict = ui(c−1)(t−1) + rict (5)
p∑
j=0
ρjvict−j =
q∑
j=0
θjεict−j (6)
The variance of individual earnings could change with age or labour market ex-
perience. Therefore, apart from allowing for permanent individual differences in the
level of (log) earnings, one may also allow for different growth rates in earnings across
individuals. In equation 4, aict is the age of individual i at time t and ηi is the ran-
dom growth term with mean 0 and variance σ2η. The intercept αic represents earnings
capacity at the beginning of the working life, determined by schooling or other time-
invariant ability shifters. The growth parameter, ηi, captures idiosyncratic earnings
capacity related to age (or experience). For example, in a human capital framework
8See Hause (1980), Baker (1997), Dickens (2000), Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002), Ramos (2003),
Baker and Solon (2003), Kalwij and Alessie (2003), Cappellari (2004).
9See Dickens (2000), Moffitt and Gottschalk(1995, 2002), Ramos (2003), Baker and Solon (2003),
Kalwij and Alessie (2003), Cappellari (2004).
10Several studies fit an ARMA(1,1) –Dickens (2000), Moffitt and Gottschalk(1995, 2002), Biewen
(2005)–, while some others model it as a first-order autoregresive process, AR(1), –Baker and Solon
(2003), Ramos (2003), Cappellari (2004).
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it may result from differential learning ability on-the-job.11 A negative covariance
between αi and ηi implies that the two sources of heterogeneity offset each other, as
could be the case in the presence of investments in (generic) on-the-job training (see
Hause (1980)). Alternatively, a positive σαη implies rising permanent inequality over
the life-cycle, which is consistent with schooling-matching models, where more edu-
cated workers have higher initial earnings and where in addition these grow faster as
the quality of the match is revealed to employers –partly due to their higher propensity
to acquire skills on the job.
The returns to human capital may have changed over time as a result of permanent
shocks. A simple way to incorporate such non-stationary pattern of earnings is by
employing year-specific factor loadings on the permanent and transitory components
of relative earnings, pt and λt. An increase in pt increases the spread of the earnings
distribution but does not affect the ranking of individuals. Then, if the variance of
the transitory component does not change, an increase in pt decreases wage mobility.
Since earnings shocks may have permanent effects, equation 5 specifies a random-
walk component in earnings growth, where rict is a ”white noise” innovation with
variance σ2r . The random-walk innovation rict, unlike the transitory innovation εict
in equation 6, accommodates any permanent reordering of workers in the earnings
distribution.
Cohort shifters gc and sc allow for earnings and its components to vary according
to the different life-cycle stage in which they are observed and help distinguish life
cycle dynamics from secular changes in earnings inequality.
Finally, equation 6 incorporates serial correlation of the transitory component, vict
is assumed to follow an ARMA(p,q) process and εict is assumed to be white noise,
i.e. serially independently distributed error term with mean 0 and variance σ2ε . The
autoregressive parameters are denoted by ρj with ρ0 = 1 and the moving average
parameters are denoted by θj with θ = 0 . The parameter ρj captures the smooth
decline of covariances as the lag length increases.12
11Other theoretical frameworks, such as signalling, matching or contract theory also predict earn-
ings heterogeneity at the start of the life cycle and during the career.
12As Lillard and Willis (1978) express, this serial correlation term may be interpreted in a couple
of ways. First, it reflects the effect of random shocks which persist longer than one year but which
deteriorate in effect over time. Second, it reflects the operation of individual, unobservable variables
which are serially correlated over time.
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5 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of fitting the general error component models out-
lined in the previous section to the elements of the covariance matrix for all four
cohorts pooled together (i.e. the 144 auto-covariances), and analyses the changes in
the permanent and transitory components over the sample period.
The parameters of the error component models are estimated using minimum dis-
tance techniques. The parameters chosen are those that minimize the (weighted) sum
of the squared distance between the covariance structure implied by the error compo-
nent model and the actual covariances.13
Goodness of fit is assessed, and nested models are tested using the sum of squared
residuals (henceforth SSR) weighted by the inverse of the estimated variance of resid-
uals. Under the null of correct specification, the SSR statistic is distributed as a chi
square with (Σc(t(t + 1) − p) degrees of freedom, where Σc is the number of cohorts
(in our case 4), t is the number of waves and p is the number of parameters.
We have followed a general to specific modelling strategy where, in the case of
nested models, the restrictions imposed by more parsimonious models are tested. Here
we only present the models which show a better fit. The first two columns of Table 1
present parameter estimates of one of our preferred models:
yict = ptgc[αic + ηiaict] + scvict (7)
where (αi, ηi) ∼ [(0, 0); (σ2α, σ2η, σαη)]
vict = ρ1vict−1 + λtεict (8)
with εict ∼ (0, σ2ε) and vict ∼ (0, σ20,cohort...)
This specification is similar to the model represented by equations (4), (5) and (6)
in Section 4, without a random walk in the permanent component and with the time
shifter of the transitory component applying only to the white noise error term. The
permanent component is specified as a random growth in age and the transitory com-
ponent follows an AR(1) process with cohort-based heteroscedastic initial variances,
13For a detailed description of the statistical methodology employed to estimate the models see
Abowd and Card (1989), Dickens (2000), Cappellari (2004). Following Altonji and Segal (1996), we
use the identity matrix as a weighting matrix.
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and time- and cohort- specific loading factors on both components. The model is very
similar to Cappellari (2004)’s model for the case of Italy.
The estimated coefficients for the long-term earnings component indicate that both
time-invariant and age-related heterogeneity matter for the formation of long-term
earnings differentials. The estimates of σ2α and σ
2
η in the first two rows, capture the
individual heterogeneity in the intercept and slope of the age-earnings profile. Our es-
timate of σ2η implies that a worker with an earnings growth rate one standard deviation
above the mean accumulates a 15% earnings advantage in ten years.14
The negative estimate of σαη indicates a trade-off between initial earnings and sub-
sequent earnings growth; that is, consistent with the on-the-job-training hypothesis,
individual age-earnings profiles seem to cross at relatively early stages of the working
career. This is also the evidence found in several previous studies.15
The estimates of the time-specific loading factors on the permanent component,
pt, are typically close to 1. However, the time shifters tend to reproduce the inverted
u-shape trend characterizing cross-sectional differentials. First increase with respect to
1994, then decrease sharply in the recovery of the Spanish economy until 1999 where
the coefficient remains rather constant and close to 1 again.16 This suggests that the
persistent component plays an important role in explaining the rather stable earnings
inequality over the sample period.
The estimated cohort-specific loading factors, gcohort , indicate that the persistent
component increases over the life-cycle, but for the oldest cohort.
The second panel of Table 1 reports the estimated parameters for the transitory
component. The estimates of the initial variances, which capture the accumulation
of the transitory process up to the start of the sample period for each cohort, show
that they are most important for the older cohorts (with the exception of the oldest
cohort, for which the t-ratio is rather low). Thus, initial variances contribute to the
cohort-related heteroscedasticity in the transitory component.
The rather small serial correlation parameter estimate (ρ = 0, 58) implies that the
effect of random shocks dies out very quickly, becoming negligible after five years: only
14The estimate of σ2η is 0.0002 so,
√
0.0002 = 0.01414 → 1.0141410 = 15.07%.
15Lillard and Weiss (1979), Hause (1980), Baker (1997) and Ramos (2003). But see Cappellari
(2004) for the opposite result.
16For identification, pt for 1993 (wave 1), λt for 1993 and 1994, and gcohort and scohort for the
youngest cohorts are all set to 1.
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6.8 percent of a shock to the transitory component is still present after five years.17
Not surprisingly, the time-specific loading factors on the transitory innovation dis-
play a much larger variation than the corresponding loading factors for the persistent
component. They help accommodate the movements observed in actual variances:
their relative decline for 1996 and for the last three years of the sample closely follows
the trend of the observed variance.
Finally, the estimated cohort-specific loading factors on the transitory component,
scohort..., are smaller than 1 and they decrease very rapidly as older cohorts are consid-
ered, indicating that earnings volatility tends to be larger for younger cohorts. This
confirms a pattern already emerged in section 3, where covariances were found to be
lower for younger cohorts.
The parameter estimates can be used to predict the permanent and transitory
components, thereby providing insights into the extent to which changes in the dis-
tribution of life-time earnings and transitory fluctuations contribute to the evolution
of cross-sectional differentials. Figure 2 presents the actual and predicted variances of
log-earnings by cohort. Permanent and transitory components are predicted setting
transitory and permanent weights, respectively, to their 1993 values. It is worth noting
that this model is able to reproduce very closely the evolution of the observed variance
for each cohort over the sample period.
Earnings inequality -as measured by the actual variance- declines over the sample
period for all cohorts except for the oldest one. This trend is mostly accounted for by
the evolution of the transitory component. Such reduction in earnings instability is
likely to be related to the countervailing labour market reforms of 1994 and 1997, which
granted more stability to temporary employment contracts, and to the subsequent
decline in temporary employment.
17That is: 0.58345 = 0.0678.
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Table 1: Estimates of earnings dynamic models
RG + AR(1) RG + AR(1)
+σ20,cohort... = σ
2
0
RG + ARMA(1,1)
+σ20,cohort... = σ
2
0
Permanent component
Coefficient t−ratio Coefficient t−ratio Coefficient t−ratio
σ2α 0.5245 3.01 0.4797 3.41 0.452 3.11
σ2η 0.0002 1.71 0.0002 1.94 0.0001 1.69
σ2αη -0.0098 -2.09 -0.0081 -2.29 -0.0074 -2.03
p94 0.947 24.44 0.9261 23.93 0.9138 21.57
p95 1.0016 34.89 0.9924 33.41 0.988 31.64
p96 1.0545 29.22 1.0557 28.68 1.0555 27.35
p97 1.0667 28.43 1.0801 29.12 1.0795 27.7
p98 0.9876 19.43 1.0117 20.46 1.0177 19.61
p99 1.0098 14.68 1.0466 16.34 1.0616 15.73
p00 0.9911 11.85 1.0324 13.35 1.0474 13.13
g(54−63) 1.4594 6.35 1.5751 7.33 1.5637 7.15
g(44−53) 1.6878 3.22 2.1366 3.67 2.1315 3.64
g(<1943) 1.4629 2.43 2.0583 2.72 2.0972 2.66
Transitory component
Coefficient t−ratio Coefficient t−ratio Coefficient t−ratio
σ2ε 0.068 3.18 0.0646 2.96 0.6178 6.08
σ20 0.4147 6.22 0.415 6.34
σ20,>1964 0.386 5.21
σ20,54−63 0.4381 2.13
σ20,44−53 1.0607 2.98
σ20,<1943 0.2924 1.49
ρ 0.5834 5.43 0.5841 5.51 0.2732 3.59
θ -0.1354 -2.7
λ95 0.7165 8.62 0.7177 8.77 0.6931 8.39
λ96 0.9026 8.69 0.8986 8.8 0.8929 8.51
λ97 0.805 8.77 0.7993 8.84 0.7841 8.55
λ98 0.7554 8.71 0.7465 8.73 0.7309 8.25
λ99 0.6488 8.11 0.6384 8.08 0.6127 7.4
λ00 0.6296 8.42 0.6266 8.47 0.6079 7.83
s(54−63) 0.59 16.26 0.5934 15.68 0.5951 15.72
s(44−53) 0.508 12.94 0.5538 13.99 0.5562 14.15
s(<1943) 0.4359 6.49 0.4284 6.26 0.4334 6.3
SSR ∼ χ2 (d.f) 529.98 (116) 526.24 (119) 541.92 (118)
12
A closer look by cohorts reveals that transitory differences account for most of the
earnings dispersion only for the youngest one, which is consistent with the dispropor-
tionate incidence that temporary employment has on younger workers. 18 As the age
group that suffers most from temporary employment, the observed large fall in overall
earnings dispersion –the largest of all cohorts– may perfectly be a reflection of the
decline in the transitory component (see Figure 3) –Section 6 addresses this issue by
employing an extension of the model, which takes account of the type of contract.
Long-term inequality appears to be at higher levels for older cohorts relative to
younger ones, which is consistent with the evidence of life cycle earnings divergence
provided earlier. In addition, the incidence of long-term variance on overall inequality
tends to be larger the older the cohort considered, reflecting lower volatility.
Our results are similar to those in Baker and Solon (2003), who find that the
persistent component has played at least a somewhat larger role in Canada. For
Italy, Cappellari (2004) finds that inequality trends have been driven by the long-term
earnings component. The reported Spanish earnings mobility patterns across cohorts
are also in line with previous studies, where transitory differences appear to fall over
the life cycle, being especially high for younger age groups. Finally, the reported
moderate degree of persistence of the transitory shocks is not at odds with previous
estimates.
Given the similar size of several estimated cohort-specific initial variances, we next
test whether the initial heteroscedasticity is statistically defensible with the Spanish
data and analyze the implications for the earnings components. Columns 3 and 4 of
Table 1 present the results of assuming homoscedastic initial conditions (i.e. σ20,>1964 =
σ20,54−63 = σ
2
0,44−53 = σ
2
0,<1943 = σ
2
0 ), while keeping the random growth specification of
the permanent component. A Wald test on this restriction does not reject the null that
initial variances are all the same (χ2 = 3.74 and 4 degrees of freedom). Relative to the
previous model, the most noticeable change is the increase in the cohort-specific loading
factors of the permanent component. The relative contribution of the permanent and
transitory components to the total variance is very similar to that obtained in the
previous model.
The models used in previous studies typically impose zero restrictions on the time
18As many as 57.22% hold temporary contracts in the youngest cohort. This figure is 25.5%, 18.3%
and 17.5% for the second, third and oldest cohort respectively.
13
Figure 2: Actual and predicted variances with permanent and transitory
predicted components, by cohort.
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Figure 3: Predicted permanent and transitory components by cohort as
percentage of predicted overall variance. (RG + AR(1))
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and cohort loading factors used in our model. Therefore, Table 2 shows Wald test
statistics on these restrictions and reveals that such restrictions are untenable in our
case.
Table 2: Wald Test of Parameter Restrictions to the Base Model
Restriction χ2 Degrees of Freedom
p95 = ..... = p01 = 0 64.04 7
λ96 = ..... = λ01 = 0 325.23 6
gcohort... = scohort... = 0 1180.76 6
Finally, a plausible extension of our model is to supplement the autoregressive
process already incorporated into the transitory component with a low degree moving
average process. In terms of our estimated model, this implies replacing the AR(1)
specification of equation 8 with the following ARMA(1,1) one:
vit = ρ1vit−1 + θ1εit−1 + λtεit (9)
with εit ∼ (0, σ2ε) and vit ∼ (0, σ20,cohort...)
The estimates of this full extended model suffered from some identification prob-
lems.19 Consequently, we have restricted the initial conditions to be equal across
cohorts. The results of this model are provided in the last two columns of Table 1.
The first thing to note is that the data reject the null of θ = 0 (χ2 = 15.68 and
one degree of freedom). Notwithstanding this, the new ARMA specification has very
little effect on the other parameter estimates –with the notable exception of ρ, which
decreases to 0.27– or on the decomposition of earnings inequality into its persistent
and transitory components. The coefficients of the transitory ARMA(1,1) component
are all significant, with a not very persistent AR parameter, ρ. Thus, the effect of a
transitory shock to earnings would decline very quickly over time, with only 1% of the
shock still present after 3 years. The negative MA component (-0.14) implies that the
auto-covariances decline sharply over the first period.
In sum, all three models in Table 1 provide a good fit, have similar SSR and yield
similar predicted permanent and transitory components.
19The model suffers from convergence problems: i.e. the model does not converge, or it converges
to a solution with negative estimates of some variance.
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6 The effect of temporary contracts on earnings
instability
Fixed-term or temporary contracts spread in many European countries in the Nineties
as a result of changing labour market legislation (Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Kahn
(2007)), but nowhere are they as prevalent as in Spain –where temporary employment
accounts for about one third of total employment.
Fixed-term or temporary employment is characterized by short job tenure and
more frequent job changes (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002) and Dolado, Garca-
Serrano, and Jimeno (2002)). Previous evidence suggests that these two features are
likely to influence earnings instability: Voluntary and involuntary (i.e. displacement)
job changes are found to affect the transitory variance of earnings (Leonardi (2003),
Huff-Stevens (2001)), while Cappellari and Leonardi (2006) find a negative relationship
between tenure and instability.
A large literature has studied the effect of fixed-term contracts on employment, un-
employment, and job flows (Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002), Messina and Vallanti
(2007)) but not much attention has been devoted to their effect on earnings instability
–Cappellari and Leonardi (2006) being a notable exception. Yet, the earnings insta-
bility associated with fixed-term contracts is one of the main concerns among policy
makers.
Earnings instability that results from temporary employment is also relevant as it
determines individual behaviour and economic wellbeing. As long as earnings instabil-
ity translates into uncertainty, the evolution of temporary employment explains also
many important decisions such as emancipation or fertility (Ahn and Mira (2001)).
The previous section shows that earnings instability falls over the second half of the
Nineties, and that such decrease is especially notable for the youngest cohort. At the
same time, the share of temporary employment experienced the largest (relative) fall
since the 1984 labour market reform, which triggered the sharp increase in temporary
employment over the following decade. For our sample period, Figure 4 shows that the
share of temporary employment. The evolution parallels the trend of the estimated
transitory component (see Figure 2), which suggests a direct relationship between
temporary employment and earnings instability.
This section explores this relationship further, and investigates whether and the
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Figure 4: Percentage of Temporary Contracts in our sample
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Note: We begin in the year 2004 because we do not have good information of the type of contract for
the year 2003. Source: ECHP, own calculations.
extent to which the reduction in temporary employment is responsible for the reduced
volatility of earnings. In particular, we estimate how much more unstable the earnings
of workers on fixed-term contract are relative to those on permanent contract by mod-
elling the effect of fixed-term contracts on the transitory and permanent components
of earnings, as in Cappellari and Leonardi (2006).
To investigate the effects of temporary employment we use a stripped-down version
of our preferred model (equations 7 and 8) –basically, dispensing with the random
growth term–,
yict = ptgcαic + scvict (10)
where
vict = ρ1vict−1 + λtεict (11)
and express the innovations to the permanent and transitory components as a function
of the proportion of individuals on fixed-term contract
σ2αct = δ + γE(fict) (12)
σ2εct = ψ + piE(fict) (13)
where fict indicates whether individual i from cohort c is on a fixed-term contract in
period t.
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation. The negative fixed-term contract coef-
ficient (γ = −0.778) in the permanent component indicates that workers on temporary
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Table 3: Model of Fixed-term contract
Coefficient t ratio
δ 0.1847 4.38
γ -0.7781 -7.24
ψ 0.0862 4.43
pi 0.3972 4.81
σ20,>1964 0.4095 5.53
σ20,54−63 0.3274 2.14
σ20,44−53 0.5895 3.86
σ20,<1943 0.0795 0.57
ρ 0.5685 2.66
g(54−63) 1.1623 12.61
g(44−53) 1.3648 10.66
g(<1943) 1.3650 10.70
s(54−63) 0.7342 7.12
s(44−53) 0.6575 6.12
s(<1943) 0.5734 4.77
SSR ∼ χ2 (d.f) 348.17 (116)
employment have on average lower long-term earnings variance relative to workers on
permanent employment. Likewise, the positive coefficient (pi = 0.397) in the transitory
variance implies larger instability for workers on fixed-term contract relative to work-
ers on permanent contract –which corroborates the intuition of a positive relationship
between instability and temporality, obtained from the visual inspection of the trends
of temporary employment and the transitory earnings component (see Figures 2 and
4). The lower permanent variance probably reflects the lower heterogeneity of workers
on fixed-term contracts in terms of age, education and other observed and unobserved
permanent characteristics, while the larger transitory variance picks up the effect of
lower tenure and higher job mobility –among other factors that are associated with
fixed-term contracts and affect earnings transitorily.
The larger instability faced by temporary workers can be clearly illustrated by
comparing the predicted average transitory variance in a given year by contract type.
To build such predictions we make use of the estimates of Table 3, and consider two
comparison scenarios: individuals on fixed-term contract with probability given by the
share of temporary employment in their cohort in a given year, and individuals who
have always been on fixed-term contracts, i.e. with probability one.20
20We set pi = 0 to predict the transitory variance of a permanent contract, weight pi by the second
moment of the dummy to predict the variance of a transitory contract, and weight pi by one to predict
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Table 4: Predicted Transitory Variance by Contract Type
Cohort born Cohort born Cohort born Cohort born
after 1964 1954-1963 1964-1953 before 1943
Permanent 0.0687 0.037 0.0297 0.0226
Temporary 0.2122 0.0749 0.0524 0.0424
Temporary always 0.3851 0.2076 0.1664 0.1266
We show the results of this counterfactual exercise in Table 4 broken down by
cohort for the year 2000. The predicted value of the transitory variance of earnings is
larger for individuals on temporary contract than for those on permanent contract, and
the difference increases as we move towards the younger cohorts. Temporary contract
workers can expect earnings instability which is twice as large as that for permanent
workers. However, such differential is much larger for workers on temporary contracts
for their entire working life, as they can expect earnings instability 5 to 6 times higher
than that for workers on permanent contract. The last value changes little across
cohorts.21
Thus, beyond the well documented effect of temporary contract on earnings lev-
els (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002), Davia and Hernanz (2004)) and wage
growth (Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007)), our results show that the type
of contract determines the dynamics of earnings, and that temporary contracts are
responsible for higher earnings instability.
7 Final remarks
In this paper we examine whether recent earnings inequality trends in Spain were
driven by changing long-term earnings inequality or were related to changes in earnings
instability. Our findings suggest that the observed decline in earnings dispersion was
mostly due to a fall in earnings instability. Over the course of the analyzed period
(1993-2000), earnings dispersion became more persistent and much less transitory. We
also show that relative earnings persistence increases over the life-cycle, which implies
lower instability for older cohorts. That is, earnings instability seems to fall over the
the variance of workers on temporary contracts for life.
21Our results are very much in line with those obtained by Cappellari and Leonardi (2006) for
Italy.
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life cycle, being especially high for younger age groups. Our findings are in line with
previous findings for some European and North American countries.
The excessively large share of temporary employment is one of the most salient fea-
tures of the Spanish labour market since the mid-Eighties. Over the second half of the
Nineties, several labour market reforms substantially changed important employment
protection provisions and lowered payroll taxes. As a result, temporary employment
experienced the largest fall since the sudden increase that followed the 1984 reform
–which pushed temporary employment to account for over 30% of overall employment
over the subsequent two decades. Our results suggest that the decline in temporary
employment is responsible for the fall in earnings instability, which in turn accounts
for most of the declining earnings inequality trend.
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